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Introduction
There are many ways in which internal security 
concerns are being prioritised and mainstreamed in 
EU action in West Africa. Recent key EU foreign policy 
documents, such as the Global Strategy (2016) and the 
CSDP Compact (2018) have reinforced the ‘internal-
external security nexus’ and called for enhancing 
cooperation between actors, alignment of processes 
and convergence of tools of Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) and Freedom, Security and 
Justice (FSJ). The Commission-run external policy 
instruments (ENP, IcSP, EDF, DCI) are now funding an 
increasing amount of projects pursuing the objectives 
of supporting third countries’ internal security and 
criminal justice apparatuses to fight transnational 
crime, terrorism and irregular migration. In addition, 
large-scale emergency and ad-hoc solutions have been 
put in place to tackle irregular migration and crimes 
perceived to be related to it. ‘Migration deals’ have 
been negotiated with third countries with varying track 
records on human rights. An EU Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa (EUTF) was created in 2015 to mainstream 
migration management in all EU external action. The 
Fund now comprises 4,1 billion euro, much of which 
goes to enhancing the internal security apparatuses 
and borders of African states. Tackling ‘illicit flows’ by 
enhancing internal security, police and borders is not 
a novelty in EU external policy. What is new, however, 
is the unprecedented amount funds and projects put 
towards it, and the fact that security sector reform 
(SSR) will now be among the EU’s main forms of 
external engagement (European Commission 2016).
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The Sahel region cutting across the West and Central 
African Sahara desert has become a priority to the EU 
in terms of fighting transnational crime and security 
threats. Mali is experiencing a multidimensional 
crisis. Extreme poverty and climate changes were 
supplemented in 2012 by a Tuareg rebellion, a coup 
d’etat, and a complex landscape of ‘Islamist’ insurgent 
groups. International actors descended on the country 
to do all sorts of security-related projects, leading to 
what some have called a ‘security traffic jam’. France 
intervened militarily in 2013 and is still on the ground 
to ‘fight terrorists’, alongside a UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) and two 
The pursuit of internal security objectives has 
become increasingly important in EU foreign 
policy and external relations. The EU now invests 
a growing number of efforts towards fighting 
‘security threats’ and transnational crime in the 
(extended) neighbourhood. This is particularly 
evident in the Sahel region of West Africa, where 
initiatives focusing on bolstering internal security 
apparatuses and borders are mushrooming. The 
question is whether the EU’s emerging role as 
a ‘global crime fighter’ contributes to fostering 
human security or satisfying the internal security 
priorities of the member states, and whether 
the two are at all compatible. A closer look at 
EU policies in the Sahel suggests that solutions 
based on criminalisation and repression can 
have harmful unintended consequences which 
can even destabilise the region. 
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EU CSDP training missions – one military (EUTM) 
and one civilian (EUCAP). This list is not exhaustive. 
Mali’s more stable neighbour to the east, Niger, 
became a priority to Europe first and foremost due 
to it being a transit country for migrants travelling 
to Libya, particularly after the fall of Gaddafi. The 
country is now seen as a key partner for the EU in the 
fight against irregular migration and in ‘breaking the 
business model of smugglers,’ and EU member states 
are building new embassies in the capital Niamey.   
Transnational crime and migrant smuggling
The fight against transnational organised crime 
has been a key priority for EU security strategies for 
decades. The ‘external dimension’ (i.e., cooperation 
with third countries) has been reiterated as a 
necessity to counter it (Council 2003; 2005; 
2010). The reason for this is that transnational 
(organised) crime has been conceptualised by the EU 
predominantly as cross-border illicit flows, meaning 
the cross-border mobility of prohibited goods or 
individuals threatening to spill over into the EU from 
the neighbourhood and beyond. An intellectually 
intuitive solution to such a threat, which has come 
to be the EU’s response by default, is border security.
The category of ‘transnational (organised) crime’ 
has, however, encompassed a broad range of very 
different activities and phenomena which used to 
be dealt with separately by the member states. They 
are not easily lumped together. This category has 
also tended to fluctuate with the political agenda 
of the EU and its member states, and has typically 
included issues such as trafficking in drugs, weapons 
and humans, cybercrime and terrorism-financing. As 
migration has come to be the most pressing issue 
on the EU’s agenda in recent years and the political 
climate in Europe has framed migration as an 
existential threat, so has a relatively new transnational 
organised crime category become crucial: ‘migrant 
smuggling.’ Consolidated in a Protocol to the UN 
Convention on Transnational Organised Crime 
(UNTOC) in 2000, ‘migrant smuggling’ is essentially 
helping someone against a benefit in breaching a 
country’s immigration law (e.g. transporting a person 
without valid ID documents across a border). It is a 
very different crime than ‘human trafficking’, which 
has its own parallel UNTOC Protocol, and which 
means exploiting the vulnerability of a trafficked 
victim (e.g. slavery or forced prostitution). However, 
these two types of crime are often conflated in policy 
discourse, which has boosted moral legitimacy for 
waging a war on people who assist migrants on the 
move. The conflation of different security policy 
issues is however not uncommon to the Justice and 
Home Affairs sphere of EU policy making: responses 
such as border security, police surveillance, security 
technologies and databases are prescribed to 
counter all different (real or perceived) security 
threats simultaneously – terrorism, organised 
crime, human trafficking, migrant smuggling as 
well as irregular migration (Bigo 2000). These crime 
definitions and crime control models are now also 
increasingly exported to third countries in order to 
harness them in helping the EU to stop ‘illicit flows’ 
long before reaching the external borders. 
The Sahel – battleground for the EU’s wars 
on crime  
Tackling Justice and Home Affairs issues such as 
terrorism, transnational crime and irregular migration 
has become crucial to the EU’s policies, projects and 
missions in the Sahel region. This is typically done 
through ‘assistance’ to drafting regional and national 
security strategies and penal codes, and through 
advising, training, equipping and capacity-building 
of internal security and criminal justice apparatuses. 
There has been a re-orientation in the work of the EU 
Delegations as well as the civilian CSDP missions 
in Niger and Mali that reflects the internal-external 
security nexus in EU policy, according to interviewees 
from these entities. EU Delegations work with 
relatively new counterparts such as Ministries 
of Interior, Justice, (border) police, gendarmerie 
and customs authorities. Security attachés and 
Frontex representatives have recently been posted 
to the Delegations. Among the Trust Fund projects 
managed by the Delegations can be mentioned GAR-
SI (41,6 million euro), which builds gendarmerie units 
to counter terrorism and transnational organised 
crime in the G5 Sahel countries, PARSEC (29 million 
euro) in Mali on security in the region of Mopti 
including borders, and AJUSEN (30 million euro) 
in Niger to support justice and security ‘to fight 
organised crime, smuggling and human trafficking’. 
Also the CSDP missions have incrementally seen 
a re-orientation from a focus on institution- and 
statebuilding towards securitised crime-fighting. 
Since its inception in 2012, EUCAP Sahel Niger has 
had a (non-operational) mandate on countering 
terrorism and transnational organised crime, and 
in 2015 ‘irregular migration and associated criminal 
activities’ was added. The mission then opened an 
antenna in the northern town of Agadez, seen as 
a hub for migrants travelling to Libya and Algeria, 
to support Nigerien law enforcement in the fight 
against ‘migrant smugglers’. The mandate and 
activities of EUCAP Sahel Mali, launched in 2015, 
has also moved from state and institution-building 
(efficacy, hierarchical chains, role of judicial and 
administrative authorities) towards development of 
crime-fighting capabilities such as intelligence-led 
counter-terrorism and border policing.  
Following the principle of ‘African solutions to 
African problems,’ international donors, including 
the EU and its member states, have also pledged 
millions of euro to a Joint Force to fight terrorism and 
organised crime, consisting of security forces from 
the G5 Sahel. This is a security-focused sub-regional 
organisation that emerged in 2014 comprising the 
countries Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and 
Niger. The EU is pushing for the development of a 
police component within the G5 Sahel Joint Force. 
Most the EU security-related missions and projects 
in the region have some supporting function for the 
new G5 structure or units. Training on human rights 
has also become a priority after Malian armed forces 
including G5 contingents were recently accused of 
committing war crimes. 
Countering crime or producing insecurity? 
While Malian and Nigerien authorities are seemingly 
very much welcoming the EU’s security-oriented 
initiatives (and particularly the budget support that 
follows in their wake, increasingly tied to security 
indicators), the full impact of crime-fighting projects 
is sometimes not well-understood in Europe. Some 
EU policies and projects have had unintended 
consequences which has fuelled resistance among 
local communities and civil society organizations 
(CSOs). They may harm the EU’s overall standing in 
the region in the long term. 
The political economy of the Sahara desert is more 
complex than what is often assumed in the design 
of border security and crime-fighting projects. 
International policy discourse tends to portray the 
Sahara as an ‘ungoverned space’ where the state 
needs to be re-inserted and ‘porous borders’ re-
enforced.  In reality, hybrid (security) orders, including 
‘big men’ and their patronage networks, control or 
compete to control trade in all kinds of commodities, 
and the distinction between legal and illegal is often 
blurred (Raineri and Strazzari 2017). These actors 
are sometimes non-state, sometimes state, and 
often something in-between (Bøås 2015). Cracking 
down on all kinds of activities defined in international 
conventions as ‘transnational organised crime’ may 
upset a fragile micro-political stability that these 
hybrid actors ensure. International actors know this, 
and there seems to be a de facto hierarchy in the 
security priorities where ‘terrorists’ are chased, while 
‘drug traffickers’ are often left untouched. 
Most European crime-fighting projects are centred 
on border security, police training and promoting the 
sharing of intelligence – often through technological 
solutions. The idea is that border posts and its 
security personnel will represent the state in remote 
border regions, and function as a ‘filter’ that lets 
licit flows go through while stopping illicit ones. 
However, some of these are border regions where 
the state has never really been in control of its entire 
territory, where security forces and police are seen 
as predatory by the local populations, and where 
electricity for security technology is non-existent. 
Land borders are colonially-inherited lines in the 
sand, and in the case of Mali only a small share of 
these borders have even been demarcated. In many 
of the regions where trafficking in illicit commodities 
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is prevalent, the territory is not in the state’s control, 
and it is simply too dangerous for international 
actors and contracted staff to construct border posts 
there. Success indicators such as ‘number of border 
stations supported to strengthen border control’ – 
applied by the Trust Fund to measure ‘governance’ 
– does not tell much about the nature, extent or level 
of harm of the extra-legal trans-Saharan trade, nor 
the impact of security and crime control efforts on it. 
One crime-fighting effort that has been seen as a 
big success by the EU is the ‘assistance’ to Niger 
(pushed by aid conditionality) to adopt a law 
criminalising migrant smuggling and rigorously 
enforcing it. Since 2016, more than 130 so-called 
migrant smugglers were arrested and more than 250 
vehicles confiscated in the northern region of Agadez 
where the law was selectively enforced. The amount 
of migrants crossing the border into Libya registered 
by IOM (which IOM acknowledged did not reflect the 
entire number of crossings) dropped. However, the 
local population and CSOs in Agadez are strongly 
opposed to the criminalisation of mobility which has 
been crucial to the region for centuries (interviews 
with author, Niamey 2017). They claim the law is 
de facto suspending the ECOWAS Protocol on free 
movement for ECOWAS citizens, which most of the 
migrants are. Moreover, research has documented 
severe destabilising effects of the law enforcement 
as the economy of the region of Agadez collapsed, 
leading the local population to lose their livelihoods, 
fuelling economic frustrations and anger, and 
increasing armed banditry and general insecurity 
(Molenaar et al. 2017). The transport of migrants 
went underground and led to more dangerous routes 
for migrants as well as to more professionalised 
‘smugglers’ (Brachet 2018). The risk of repeating 
the typical success measurements originating from 
a (European) law enforcement perspective, such as 
number of arrests, confiscations and seizures, is that 
it ignores the impact on the social context in which 
crime and its repression is embedded. Moreover, a 
narrow repression of one social phenomenon might 
have a destabilising effect and lead to aggravating 
other, potentially more dangerous ones. It has been 
argued that combating ‘migration smuggling’ can 
endanger other security imperatives of EU as it can 
lead to destabilising Niger, increasing radicalisation 
and recruitment to ‘Islamist’ insurgencies already 
present, as well as bolstering other kinds of trafficking 
such as in drugs (Raineri 2018). 
Conclusions 
The policies of the EU in Africa and the Sahel are 
increasingly driven by the internal security priorities 
of the member states, particularly on migration and 
terrorism. The solutions are also increasingly centred 
on security, police, surveillance and borders. However, 
a too narrow focus on combating unwanted social 
phenomenon through criminalisation and repression, 
based on thin assessments of local micro-politics 
and potential outcomes, can lead to unintended 
consequences and even aggravate the situation in 
the EU’s extended neighbourhood. Such adverse 
effects will not be captured by the current, simplistic 
and predominantly quantitative success indicators 
that focus on numbers of ‘criminals caught’ and 
migrants stopped. If the EU is actually interested in 
improving human security in the Sahel, then context 
and conflict sensitivity, understanding of the local 
hybrid (security) orders and bottom-up design of 
projects are important. 
However, the trend of EU member states’ internal 
security interests dominating EU foreign policy 
is not only likely to persist but also to accelerate 
in the future. This seems evident when looking at 
the current planning of a new EU foreign policy 
mega-instrument for the next multiannual financial 
framework (MFF) 2021-2027: the Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation 
Instrument. Out of the almost 90 billion euro that this 
instrument is supposed to comprise, a substantial 
part is to be made flexible for the member states’ 
‘foreign policy needs’. It should be remembered 
that while the compatibility of top-down EU internal 
security interests with bottom-up local needs of 
African communities may be reiterated in press 
releases about new EU-Africa ‘partnerships’, it does 
not necessarily reflect the reality on the ground. Basing 
policies on wishful thinking and short-term barriers 
while ignoring micro-politics and protests of local 
communities may continue producing unintended 
effects. 
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